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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880373-CA 
v. $ 
MARY SEAMSTER, t Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Should this Court grant rehearing to modify the 
memorandum decision in this case to reflect the statutory 
requirement that it was the duty of the Utah County Attorney to 
represent the State and of the American Fork City Attorney to 
represent American Fork City in this case and not of the Attorney 
General? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty in the Circuit Court to two 
separate drunk driving charges (R. Vol. I at 37, R. Vol. II at 
32). Circuit Court case number 88-CR-186 was filed by the Utah 
County Attorney charging defendant with drunk driving under state 
law. Circuit Court case number 881000106 was filed by the 
American Fork City Attorney charging defendant with drunk driving 
under city ordinance. The cases were heard together by Judge 
John Backlund# however, there is no order formally consolidating 
the cases. Defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive 20 day 
sentences on each conviction (R. Vol. I at 13). 
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Defendant appealed to this Court complaining that she 
should not have been sentenced consecutively. The notices of 
appeal contain both lower court case numbers and both were served 
only on the Utah County Attorney (R. Vol. I at 8, R. Vol. II at 
6). The circuit court clerk transmitted two separate volumes of 
pleadings, one for each lower court case, however, this has been 
treated as one appeal. 
Defendant filed her brief on November 4, 1988. The 
respondent's brief was due on December 4, 1988. When no 
respondent's brief was filed on that date# this Court sent a 
letter addressed to defendant-appellant's attorney, Gary H. 
Weight, with copies to Sherry Ragan (Deputy Utah County Attorney) 
and to the Attorney General stating that the respondent must file 
a brief by December 30, 1988. See Appendix A. No respondent's 
brief was filed and this Court issued its memorandum decision 
affirming defendant's sentences on January 26, 1989. See 
Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
All relevant facts are contained in the Statement of 
the Case above or elsewhere in the body of this petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant rehearing to modify its 
decision in this case to delete the reprimand of the Attorney 
General for failing to file a brief because there is a specific 
statute requiring the county attorney and the city attorney to 
file briefs in this case. Moreover, a review of this Court's 
file reveals that the Attorney General, even in a supervisory 
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capacity, could not have known that there was a failure on the 
part of the county attorney to pursue this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court outlined the bases for granting 
a petition for rehearing in Cumminqs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 
172-3, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913): 
When this court . . . has considered and 
decided all of the material questions 
involved in a case, a rehearing should not be 
applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some material fact or facts, or 
have overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we have 
based the decision on some wrong principle of 
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . . If there are some reasons . . . 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
Under this standard, the State is entitled to a rehearing for the 
purpose of modifying the second paragraph of this Court's 
memorandum decision which overlooks material facts and relevant 
statutes, or for the other good reasons more specifically 
outlined below. 
The second paragraph of this Court's decision states: 
Respondent State of Utah did not file any 
brief in this matter, either by the Attorney 
General, its attorney under Utah Code Ann. S 
67-5-1 (1988), or by the Utah County 
Attorney. It is unfortunate that the State's 
neglect in this and other matters prevents 
this Court from the benefit of a thoughtful, 
reasoned response by respondent to 
appellant's views. 
State v. Seamster# case no. 880373-CA, slip op. at 1 (filed Jan. 
26, 1989) (copy in Appendix B). The State does not dispute that 
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no respondent's brief was filed in this case nor does it dispute 
that briefing from both parties is beneficial to this Court. The 
State does disagree, however, that it was the Attorney General's 
duty to file the respondent's brief. 
Utah Code Ann. S 67-5-1 (1988), cited in Seamster, 
provides that "The attorney general shall: (1) attend the . . . 
Court of Appeals . . . and prosecute or defend all causes to 
which the state . . . is a party . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-
11 (1987) more specifically provides, on the other hand, that 
The county attorney shall represent the 
interests of the state as public prosecutor 
in any criminal appeals from the circuit 
court. City attorneys shall represent the 
interests of municipalities in any appeals 
from circuit courts involving violations of 
municipal ordinances. 
Because the general rule of statutory construction is that when 
two statutes conflict, the more specific provision governs over 
the more general provision, Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984), S 78-4-11 governs over § 67-
5-1. It was, therefore, the duty of the county attorney and of 
the city attorney to file a respondent's brief in this case. 
It may be argued that the Attorney General in his 
supervisory capacity over county attorneys, see § 67-5-1(5), 
should have acted when notified that the respondent's brief had 
not been filed. The Attorney General was provided with a copy of 
this Court's default letter dated December 19, 1988 stating that 
the respondent's brief had not been filed. See Appendix A. 
Close inspection of that letter, however, reveals that inaction 
was understandable. 
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Because this was a case normally handled by the county 
attorney, the Attorney General was not served with most of the 
documents filed by the appellant. The Attorney General/ 
therefore/ had no file on this case and no way of tracking the 
case. Unaware that defense counsel had filed appellant's brief/ 
when the Attorney General received the default letter addressed 
to Gary H. Weight notifying him that a respondent's brief must be 
filed by Dec. 30/ 1988/ the Attorney General understandably 
assumed that use of the word respondent was inadvertent and this 
was merely a courtesy copy informing this office that defense 
counsel had not filed his brief and that no action was required 
of the Attorney General. 
This Court's file contains several documents filed by 
defense counsel on appeal. Of those documents/ only the 
docketing statement indicates that it was served on the Attorney 
General on June 24/ 1988. Given that it was also served on the 
Utah County Attorney and that this office could determine from 
the face of the document that it was not involved in the appeal/ 
the document was not retained/ if it was ever received. Other 
than the default letter/ none of the Court's correspondence was 
sent to the Attorney General either. Thus# this office 
maintained no file or other record of this appeal and had no way 
of knowing that this Court's default letter was incorrectly 
addressed to defense counsel instead of the prosecutor. 
This Court's reprimand is unfair because the Court was 
unaware of these facts and the State requests that the decision 
be modified to reflect that the county attorney and the city 
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attorney were the proper representatives of the governmental 
entities involved. The Court should also consider that defense 
counsel never served the American Fork City Attorney with any of 
the appeal pleadings, including the notice of appeal. It is 
understandable, therefore, that the city did not respond to the 
appeal. 
It may be claimed that a rehearing is not necessary in 
this case because the State's grounds for the petition do not 
affect defendant's sentences, her sole grounds for appeal. See 
Cummings, 42 Utah at 172-3, 129 P. at 624 (rehearing should not 
be applied for unless it affects the result). The State's 
grounds do affect the result of the case, neverthelessf because, 
if the petition is granted by this Court, the decision will no 
longer contain a reprimand of the Attorney General and will 
define which office is responsible for filing respondent's briefs 
in circuit court appeals to this Court. 
If this Court denies the petition for rehearing, the 
State alternatively requests that this Court consider this 
petition as a motion to modify its decision to delete the 
reprimand of the Attorney General for failure to file a brief. 
If allowed to stand, the decision impacts the reputation of this 
office and is unfair where the Attorney General had no duty to 
file a brief and, even if he had a supervisory duty, could not 
have known that the State was in default from the letter he 
received from this Court. 
_ £ _ 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to rehear this case for the purpose of modifying that portion of 
the decision that reprimands the Attorney General for failing to 
file a respondent's brief. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f$t day of February, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Gary H. Weight, attorney for defendant, 43 East 200 North, 
P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603, this /ST day of February, 
1989. 
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APPENDIX A 
Regnal W. GarflT 
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Rutsell W. Bench 
Hr 
Judith M. Billings 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Norman H. Jackson 
Gregory K. Orme 
^tal] Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
December 19# 1988 
Gary H. Weight/ 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight St Esplin 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L-
Provo, UT 84603 
In Re: 
Mary T. Noonan 
OrrtrfrJ* Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. No. 880373-CA 
Mary Seamster, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Dear Mr. Weight: 
Our records indicate that the respondents brief in this 
case was due December 4, 1988 and has not been filed. 
Unless the respondent's brief and seven copies is filed by 
December 30, 1988, the matter will be submitted to the Court on 
the appellant's brief only. 
Sincerely, 
Kathleen Hopkinson 
Case Manager 
cc: Sherry Ragan 
David Wilkinson 
Attorney General 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880373-CA 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Mary Seamster, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Jackson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals her sentence upon conviction of two 
separate drunk driving charges. At sentencing, the trial court 
imposed a separate jail term for each offense, in addition to 
certain other penalties. The two jail terms were ordered to 
run consecutively. Defendant appealed, challenging the 
statutory authority to impose consecutive sanctions for 
misdemeanor violations. 
Respondent State of Utah did not file any brief in this 
matter, either by the Attorney General, its attorney under Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (19&8), or by the Utah County Attorney. It 
is unfortunate that the State's neglect in this and other 
matters prevents this Court from the benefit of a thoughtful, 
reasoned response by respondent to appellant's views. 
Defendant complains that, under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-401(1) (1978), a trial court has no power to impose 
consecutive sentences for misdemeanor convictions. Defendant 
contends that by permitting the imposition of consecutive 
sentences in felony cases, the statute necessarily excludes the 
power to impose such consecutive sentences in misdemeanor 
cases. Biil &££ Utah Code Ann., S 76-3-401(3) (1978) ("A court 
may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode. • . . * ) . 
The problem with defendant's contention is that it was 
never raised in the trial court, at sentencing or afterward. 
In fact, in a discussion at sentencing, defense counsel argued 
that a concurrent term would be adequate punishment but 
concurred that consecutive sentences were within the judge's 
discretion. 
The Court: 
. . . I don't give concurrent sentences for separate 
offenses. 
Mr, weight: 
I—well, if that's a policy of the Court, I don't know how 
to address it, your Honor. I know that the statute is 
there and it allows the Court the discretion to consider 
concurrent as opposed to consecutive sentences. 
The Court: 
. . . On a misdemeanor, the Court can impose consecutive 
sentences on multiple counts in the same Information, but 
these—these were two entirely separate occurrences. 
Hr, weight: 
I understand that. 
The Court: 
And that's why I'm saying that's my position not to give 
concurrent sentences for separate offenses. 
Hr. weight: 
Well, I suppose the only way I could address that, your 
Honor, is to plead to the Court to allow 15-day sentences 
on each, and run them concurrent. 
And I—I don't know what I could do to persuade the Court 
otherwise; . . . 
Counsel failed to raise in the trial court the issue now on 
appeal. No objection was ever interposed to the consecutive 
nature of the sentences because the statute did not allow such 
a sentence in misdemeanor cases. 
Having failed to preserve the issue on appeal by first 
bringing an articulated, specific objection to the sentence to 
ftOA191-^ft 
the attention ol the trial court, defendant is precluded from 
arguing the issue on appeal. Thomas v. State. 664 P.2d 1069 
(Okl. Cr. 1983). £fi£ also State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 896, 
899-900 (Utah 19B6). 
1 
ALL CONCUR: 
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